

Does the Australian National Framework for Values Education stifle an Education for World Peace?

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Abstract

This paper aims to offer an evaluation of Australia's National Framework for Values Education in terms of its educative value. The criteria to be employed in this evaluation shall be drawn primarily from the works of UNESCO and John Dewey. In addition to a re-evaluation of values, consideration will also be given to how individual learners are being prepared to participate democratically in the quest for world peace. It will therefore be necessary to determine whether the Australian framework promotes the potential for democratic participation through inquiry or whether through schooling its overtly nationalistic agenda actually stifles the capacity of persons to participate in a pursuit for global understandings and world peace.

Keywords: Australian values, values, valuing, educative value, Dewey,

An education for world peace

“Education cannot be satisfied with bringing individuals together by getting them to accept common values shaped in the past. It must also answer the question as to *what for and why we live together*” (Delors, 1998, *Learning the Treasure Within, Report to UNESCO*, p. 61)

Identified by this quote in the Delors report to UNESCO is the inadequacy of simply getting learners to *accept* values. Quite obviously the characteristics of learners who are successful only at uncritically accepting various curricula and values are not the ones which are able to fulfil what is understood by UNESCO as *education*. Their understanding of education includes the enablement to participate in free and critical inquiry through democratic dialogue with other communities which of course is in accordance with their primary mandate which is to promote peace globally through *collaboration*. The approaches which encourage learners to simply accept various curricula and values can be more accurately described as indoctrination rather than as education. According to UNESCO it is only by democratic education rather than by indoctrination that humankind's ability to collaborate in order to be able to live together in peace can be attained.

In order to address the perceived challenges of the new century the Delors report recommends its four pillars for education which are: learning to know; learning to do; learning to live together, learning to live with others; and learning to be. The first two of these pillars – learning to know and to do – pertain to the ever increasing amounts of know-how which is typical of traditional education but which should also be made available to all of humanity. The latter two pillars – learning to live together and to be – refer to the development of communities and individuals. It is the third pillar, learning to live together, which the commission regards as the most important as it directly relates to the pursuit of world peace.

Significantly what is identified in this Delors report is that this third pillar requires learners to know *why* we ought to live together and not just accept that we should without further elaboration. Learners are to engage with this most important pillar by inquiring into its justification, or its warrant, the reasons, purposes and rationale which are able to provide the value for this goal. This pillar is not to be presented for passive acceptance but rather its justification, that is the *why* which provides for its rationale, is a necessary component if its value is to be recognised by learners. Having a ‘why’ not only provides the necessary framework for value to be recognised but is necessary to avoid nihilism. According to Nietzsche (1967, p. 9), nihilism occurs when aims, purposes and goals are absent and when the question “‘why?’ finds no answer”. One can see then that the recommendation in the Delors report to avoid the simple acceptance of values by learners is actually a recommendation to avoid and overcome nihilism because learners will have a *why* in order to develop an understanding of the purpose, rationale and justification which give values their value.

The very nature of UNESCO's “*what for and why we live together*” requires an inquiry into the ultimate questions regarding life. These include ‘who am I?’ and ‘what is the meaning and purpose of life?’ Such questions are typically absent from schooling systems which instead privilege epistemology and require

learners to accept common (socially constructed) knowledge by constructing (or memorizing the conclusions of the inquiries of others) personal cognitive representations. This dominant practice is not without its critics. Nel Noddings (1993, p. 8, 13) has argued that “existential questions should form the organizing backbone of the curriculum” in order to avoid being part of what she describes as “a death orientation”. It is the existential meanings or what Victor Frankl (2000) calls the ‘ultimate’ meanings and purposes which form the basic *will to live* for human persons. By employing the term existential both Frankl and Noddings make an appeal to the need human persons have to recognise personal significance in the things in which they participate – such as school curricula and values education – and for which they then become personally responsible for the way they relate to them. Only when learners have meaningful reasons and a *why* are they able to commit themselves to entities such as values *because* they are convinced of their significance in relation to making life itself more worthwhile.

There are two important aspects to emerge from this. Firstly the ‘things’ which are often the products of inquiries, usually represented as knowledge, assertions and values, should not be given an unjustified privileged status. It is the processes behind them that should be prioritized *if* learners are to become educated. Therefore learners ought to be enabled to engage with the *why* of things rather than just the things themselves. It is this prioritization that led Dewey (1991, p. 16) to recommend that the term “warranted assertion” be adopted instead of knowledge because it includes the inquiry aspect, whereas ‘knowledge’ only refers to the conclusion or settlement of an inquiry.

The second aspect to emerge is the type of environment which best suits learners being enabled into inquiring into the warrants behind assertions. It is argued by UNESCO that the most educative environments are democratic in nature. However learners must be taught how to participate in democracy. This requires that they be able to *exercise* democracy and not just study about it. Such educative participation is to enable learners to “sharpen their judgment ...encourage commitment and vigorous action in all spheres of individual concern ... help them to retain their own free will, to make authentic personal choices [and]... to fight against the abuse of propaganda ...even of ‘anti-education’...” (Faure, 1972, p. 102). Such an education would allow all people to participate in the democratic dialogues required in order to pursue the goal of living peacefully with each other. Dewey (1988a, p. 363; 1990, p. 473) identified that the threat to such democratic education does not come to our nations only in the form of foreign totalitarian regimes such as witnessed in the world-wars, but democratic freedom of intellectual inquiry can be suppressed within our own so-called democratic nations through political-economic policies which tend to have their purposes disguised from the public.

In light of “the imperative for democracy” to use UNESCO’s (Delors, 1998, p. 100) phrase, learners should not be expected to simply accept the content of certain curricula in democratic societies but rather they ought to actively participate in its meaningfulness. It is not enough just to assume that because we live in so-called democratic societies that our school curricula lie beyond critique and do not require learners inquiring into their justification and finding personal significance in them. According to Armstrong:

Yet we should avoid the self-deception that as educators we are the guardians of democracy and that we in some sense stand outside the contested character of knowledge and the educational values within which knowledge is embedded. ... Educational systems ... are also given meaning by their futures and the aspirations that we have for the kind of society that we want to achieve. In the modern world, education systems are central to the contestation of political and social values. Educators, as citizens, are participants in those struggles. (Armstrong, 2006, p. 5)

Inquiring into the legitimacy of any educational program is not just pertinent for educators of course but must also include the learners themselves as they are the ones who must be convinced of its meaningfulness, especially in a world that is grappling with how to attain peace. This aspect of democratic participation into inquiring into the legitimacy of particular educational programs, including values education programs, should actually be recognised as “an indispensable dimension” (Carr & Hartnett, 1996, p. 18) of education and not an optional add-on. In light of this perspective on the need for a truly democratic education which recognises the right of learners to participate in free inquiry, we shall now review the Australian National Framework of Values Education and then examine more closely how the value of values might be recognised, in particular *educative* value.

The Australian National Framework for Values Education

The Australian Government's Values Education programme claims to link to the *National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century* (Australian Ministerial Council of Education, 2000) where it describes the nation's future as being dependant upon the values citizens have to contribute towards a productive, rewarding and just society. These agreed national goals specifically state that students who graduate from the school systems should:

have the capacity to exercise judgement and responsibility in matters of morality, ethics and social justice, and the capacity to make sense of their world, to think about how things got to be the way they are, to make rational and informed decisions about their own lives, and to accept responsibility for their own actions (Goal 1.3).

An emphasis within these national goals would appear to be upon inquiring, reasoning and critical thinking.

The National Framework for Values program began when the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) gave its unanimous support in 2002 for a Values Education Study. The results of this study were released in 2003 where it was concluded that a systematic and comprehensive approach to values education was needed. The basis for this 'need' has never been clearly articulated by the government other than it being their desire to better organise what they perceive to be approaches that are currently fragmented. This project thereby supposes that a unified approach for all school contexts is both possible and preferred. A pledge of \$29.7 million over four years was given in 2004 to fund this project. The *National Framework of Values Education for Australian Schools*, consisting of nine values, was then endorsed at the beginning of 2005 and distributed to all schools. The nine values that are recommended should be taught in Australian schools are:

1. *Care and Compassion*
2. *Doing your Best*
3. *Fair Go*
4. *Freedom*
5. *Honesty and Trustworthiness*
6. *Integrity*
7. *Respect*
8. *Responsibility*
9. *Understanding, Tolerance and Inclusion*

While the government's *Values Education Study* (2003) includes a literature review of both values and values education, the National Framework of Values document only makes a brief reference to two theoretical descriptions of values. It does not comment on either of these nor does it attempt to demonstrate how they might have informed the development of the framework. The first of these references is to Halstead and Taylor who claim that values are "*the principles and fundamental convictions which act as general guides to behaviour, the standards by which particular actions are judged as good or desirable*" (Department of Education, Science & Training, 2005, p. 8). The developers of the National Framework certainly have adopted the notion that values might be principles to guide behaviour. This is particularly demonstrated by the developers who have also adopted eight guiding principles from the *Values Education Study* which basically state that an *effective* (rather than educative) values education should enable students to apply values consistently.

The other aspects found in Halstead and Taylor's description include convictions and criteria or standards which assist in the making of evaluative judgments. The listed values in the framework might be understood as possibly offering some standards by which judgements can be made. However the capacity for making judgements is not addressed by the developers who have preferred to privilege a focus on behaviour. In their original article Halstead and Taylor (2000, p. 169) follow their definition which has been quoted above with a list of their own examples of values which include "love, equality, freedom, justice, happiness, security, peace of mind and truth". Only two of these – equality (fair go) and freedom – are found in the Australian framework, but the other six are not as these tend to lend themselves more as criteria suitable for making and evaluating judgements rather than as simple guides for behaviour. It is a concern that persons in Australia are being schooled to behave well but not to think well or develop a critical capacity to make judgements.

The second theoretical reference in this government document is made to Brian Hill (2004) who describes values as "*the ideals that give significance to our lives, that are reflected through the priorities that we choose, and that we act on consistently and repeatedly*" (DEST, 2005, p. 8). These aspects of 'giving

significance to life' and 'choosing' are both absent from the National Framework. Hill (2004, p. 4) himself criticises Halstead and Taylor's definition for being overly cognitive and failing to do justice to the important differences between *knowing* the good from *desiring* to do the good. Simply knowing about values rather than having valuable ideas and beliefs is not sufficient to cause persons to desire to act upon them. The National Framework clearly does not engage with the desires, beliefs, judgements or convictions of students. Indeed learners are not considered to have convictions that might oblige them to uphold values which may conflict with the nine listed. Hill's description is holistic and addresses the *dispositions* of persons to act in certain ways *because* of their commitments to certain beliefs. This is in contrast to the position adopted in the government's framework which focuses on behavioural outcomes which are expected to be accepted uncritically. This contrast is argued here to be significant because especially at risk is the potential to enable learners to participate in the type of democratic dialogue and form judgements which are essential for the attainment of world peace.

In the latter part of Halstead and Taylor's description there is evidence that a values education program should assist in the making and evaluating of judgements. These necessarily involve individuals making decisions in specific situations. However the developers of the National Framework take the position that individuals should *apply* what they consider to be the Australian values at all times and in all circumstances *if* indeed these persons are to be identified as Australian. But there is difficulty in conceptualising values as principles for behaving in a universal manner. For example Hill refers to the value of 'honesty' (the fifth value listed in the framework) which might be valuable in some circumstances but not valuable in others if, for example, it should involve hurting someone's feelings or compromising the safety of life. Honesty as a value cannot therefore be assumed to be valuable universally without taking into consideration specific circumstances.

Distinctly evident within this government project is a serious under-theorisation of values, values education and even education itself. Even in the scant instances when the term 'education' is employed in government literature there is little demonstrated understanding of what it means and how it differs from indoctrination. For example in the recent government publication titled *Values Education* the Federal Minister for Education, Science and Training, the Honourable Julie Bishop, states that "the purpose of education is, as it has always been, to inspire and educate" (Department of Education, Science & Training, 2006, p. 2). Leaving aside for a moment the description "to inspire" we have a self-referential truism that 'the purpose of education is to educate'. This is as profound an insight as stating that 'the purpose of cooking is to cook'. In addition to this self-referential description there is little understanding of education expressed here other than it should also 'inspire'. But this aspect of inspiration is not necessarily a characteristic that is specifically educative as we have witnessed many charismatic leaders of fundamentalist and indoctrinatory organisations also inspire their followers.

This under-theorization both of values and of education by the government is considered here to be significant especially for an educational context such as schooling. Even where there are a couple of references to how values might be understood there is little intellectual thoroughness demonstrated by the developers of the National Framework. The reference to Hill contextualises values as simply being indicative of the more substantive meaningfulness that persons have for their lives. However the National Framework primarily emphasizes that values ought be understood as principles to guide behaviour at all times and in all situations. It is the behavioural outcomes made possible by the compliance of learners to these principles which are considered to provide the demonstrable evidence that one's identity is Australian. It is this position which the developers of the National Framework have adopted which is argued here as having some major inherent problems threatening not only the possibility of any educative value being made available for the school-aged learners in Australia but also for the promotion of world peace.

How the Australian National Framework stifles an education for world peace

From both UNESCO and Dewey we find that what is required for persons to be able to pursue world peace is the ability to collaborate, negotiate and participate in democratic dialogue. Such ability is similar to the habits displayed by scientists. That is, they should have the disposition to question, examine and share the reasoning behind their understandings in order to have them critiqued publicly. They should have a willingness to test for the value of particular assertions when it is important to do so. This is necessary when engaged with other communities who believe in and are committed to world-views which might appear at odds to one's own. The type of democratic dialogue required in such circumstances is one in which participants can share the rationale, purposes and the reasons *why* they believe their own particular world-

view has merit and why the associated values are considered to have value and to be willing to have these critiqued by others.

This disposition for critical, democratic dialogue and the making of evaluations is reflected to a degree in Australia's National Goals for Schooling as referenced earlier. However it is not evident in the *Australian National Framework for Values Education*. Instead what is promoted in this framework are principles of behaviour labelled as Australian values which are designed to be accepted uncritically by students. Such a program for schooling does not just fail to enable learners to participate in the sort of democratic dialogue required to pursue world peace but it actively works against such a possibility because what is learned fundamentally by these students is obedient conformity. They are unable to offer any purposes or a rationale for their values and would only be able to respond in quite fundamentalist ways to assert that it is necessary to be obedient to state and national authorities.

Dewey was very critical of systems which promote the notion that to be a 'good' student one is required to conform to specified principles of behaviours in a passive and docile manner. He argued that:

Docility is looked upon not as ability to learn whatever the world has to teach, but as subjection to those instructions of others which reflect *their* current habits... The inert, stupid quality of current customs perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way, into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and experiment. When we think of the docility of the young we first think of the stocks of information adults wish to impose and the ways of acting they want to reproduce. (Dewey, 1988b, p. 47)

Here Dewey identifies the problem associated with prescribing the behaviours and/or the principles which attempt to guide the behaviours of students. Such approaches condition them into becoming compliant obedient servants to the manipulative desires of others. The ability to participate in negotiation and democratic dialogue is compromised for such students as they would fail to experience free intellectual inquiry into examining the justifications for these values. Dewey attempted to overcome the apparent polarization between liberation for moral personhood and the promotion of a sense of community by encouraging critical engagements between individuals and what is sanctioned by the society at large. He was not so much against traditional customs and values for which uninformed criticisms have been levelled in his direction (Hussain, 2007), but he rather argued that they should be upheld *if* indeed they could be demonstrated to be valuable for our existence.

The National Framework (2005, p. 5) states that education is about "building character". As identified in their *Values Education Study* (2003, p.176) such an emphasis on character education promotes the notion that it is possible to identify a set of universal values for which children are expected to conform their behaviour to but are not expected to reflect on or critique such values. For such programs the schooling imperative becomes one of repeated practice in order to encourage the behaviour to become a habit (Halstead and Taylor, 2000, p. 184). Noddings (2002, p. 3 & 61) identifies that programs which promote character education tend to avoid important questions and rely on approaches which can be considered to be indoctrinatory.

We must ask however what sort of person is likely to be encouraged to graduate from such a system of schooling which employs values which are presented as the standards of the community, and is such a person reflective of our nationally agreed goals which include the abilities to critically think and reason? It might be concluded then that this government framework is compromising the opportunity for our students to develop their critical capacity for evaluating values which is of great concern because such a capacity is considered by UNESCO to be essential if global peace is ever to become a reality. Compliance to principled behaviours, even when labelled as national values, do not convert persons into becoming morally good nor make them capable of participating in free intellectual inquiry through democratic dialogue which is essential for the pursuit of world peace. While the nine principles of the National Framework appear to encourage compliant behaviours to 'good' and valuable principles, their application cannot make students into morally good citizens nationally and globally. To *be* good requires that the existential dimension of persons become aligned with the significant ideas and reasons which are able to provide the value to certain acts such as caring, doing your best, honesty and toleration.

Quite clearly there is a tension between a national self-interest to preserve the status quo which privileges some nation states over others and which encourages conservative systems of schooling as typified through character education programs which are aimed to uphold such advantage, against the global or universal need to recognise that the stakes are too high in pursuing such ends. This tension is partly captured by UNESCO who report that:

The need for change, from narrow nationalism to universalism, from ethnic and cultural prejudice to tolerance, understanding and pluralism, from autocracy to democracy in its various manifestation... The stakes are high, and the moral values formed in childhood and throughout life become of particular importance. (Delors, 1998, pp. 141-2)

It is extremely important for us as educators to consider how our learners are developing and to evaluate whether they are being enabled to participate in the pursuit for world peace. Such an education requires that persons develop their capacity for critical inquiry, judgement making and living with some 'moral seriousness' as Pring (2004) describes. This is referred to as 'criticism' by Dewey (1988c, pp. 133-4) which he described as "the judgement engaged in discriminating among values. It is taking thought as to what is better and worse in any field at any time, with some consciousness of *why* the better is better and *why* the worse is worse." Quite clearly the *Australian National Framework for Values Education* does not develop this capacity and it is argued in this paper that it actually works against the development of this capacity. Such a program can therefore be considered to actually stifle an education for world peace.

So how should we respond to this values education agenda which is being promoted by politicians and government bureaucracy but which clearly under-theorizes both the notion of values and of education and stifles the ability of persons to participate in democratic dialogue? Richard Pring (2004, p. 12) observes that "education itself is a moral practice" and argues therefore "the 'practice' should be in the hands of moral educators... rather than in the hands of managers, trainers, or 'deliverers' of a curriculum." It would certainly appear that the logic of the discourse of education itself, as he describes, has disappeared altogether from the various government documents and policies dealing with schooling. Instead we have a focus upon managerial terms such as effectiveness in relation to teaching, learning, leading and in schooling. Education itself, is a moral enterprise. Educators who decide to do some activities rather than others do so through ethical reasoning and judgment making. Intrinsically education, as has clearly been demonstrated in Richard Peters land mark book *Ethics and Education*, is clearly ethical. It is therefore unnecessary in truly *educative* contexts to have particular programs of 'values education' or 'moral education' added on as extras. In order to promote Pring's argument that education should be in the hands of moral educators, it is considered important here to review the educative value of values.

The Value of Values

Paul Hirst (1965, p. 115) has argued that because education is a deliberate and purposeful activity involving human persons it "necessarily involves considerations of value". He claims whatever values are to be included they will always have a need to be both justified and deliberated. Talbot (2000, p. 15) makes the claim that it useful to contextualise the issues by asking the question "what are values?" The structure of her question however invites responses that specifically assume that values are 'things' such as principles (rules) and standards (ideals) beyond individual subjectivity. Similarly Alasdair MacIntyre (1987) argues that rational discussion about values is made possible if values become more objective by conceptualising them as nouns and as commonly accepted standards. If values are to be considered as nouns, as principles to guide the behaviour of our students, then it would appear that they should also be accompanied by some form of rational deliberation and justification as to what makes them valuable. This is especially important for our modern pluralist societies for which the problem of values as common standards is recognised by Haydon (1993, p. 14) because a non-existent monoculture is implied.

The term 'value' can be used variously. For example the term can be employed as a noun (the value) an adjective (having value) and a verb (to value or evaluate). To regard values as nouns, as having an existence or even a substance in the form of principles, their value cannot be estimated as if they were ends-in-themselves quite separate from existing persons. If values provide the end-in-view in the form of standards of behaviour expected of students, then in turn these ends also become means once they are attained as they become influential to certain ways of acting (if indeed they are practiced and applied). However Dewey was opposed to many forms of dichotomy and one of these included means and ends. He argued that it is a fallacy to regard "that ends have value independently of appraisal of means involved and independent of their own further causal effect" (Dewey, 1988d, p. 229). Quite clearly, with regards to values if they are presented as guiding principles and standards – which is the case for the National Framework – they need to be understood as being both ends and means. What is required is a justification which explains and argues why the proposed values should be considered to have value as *means* and what other ends are able to be

attained once these have been understood and adopted. That is there should be a clearly stated purpose of values education. However such a purpose is entirely absent from the National Framework.

Dewey clearly identified the difference between an objective/noun (value) and an adjective (having value). If values could be considered objectively, as instrumental or as having an essence, then they might be engaged rationally as MacIntyre has explained. However Dewey (1983, p. 20) claimed that “there *are* no such things as values” and he is surely right. There are no such *things* as Australian values. One might object to this by pointing to the nine core values listed in the National Framework. However it needs to be recognised that this list does not consist of values. Instead it predominantly lists guidelines for behaviour. If these are to be regarded as having any value the case has yet to be made as to *why* we should consider extending value *to* them.

Regarding values, Dewey’s main concern was to identify what exactly is responsible for things coming to have value. He argued “that the only thing which can be intelligibly discussed concerning value as such is the existential question – the question of how values come to be, *i.e.*, how things come to possess the quality of value” (Dewey, 1988a, p. 72). Basically he was asking us to consider ‘why value something?’ The central issue for educators is how learners are enabled *to* value (rather than *have* values). While Dewey’s reference to the existential is not readily recognisable with the European notions of Existentialism, there are some important overlaps. The ultimate existential questions for both Dewey and European existentialists are the ones which ask ‘what is *the* meaning of life?’ and ‘what is the meaning of *my* life?’ in particular.

Educative Value

The need to address the potential *educative* implications has been recognised in the government’s own *Values Education Study* but it has not provided any response to this need. If through the educative process persons are to change for the ‘better’ (Peters, 1965, p. 91), then it is argued here that their beliefs (Webster, 2004), including the way in which they intention their acts, should be affected in some worthwhile manner. Educative value must necessarily have an existential dimension to it involving the intentionality of persons as they are engaged in social relations. *Valuing* is an expression of the intentionality or disposition of individual persons. The individual is understood to be a meaning-maker or at least a meaning-recogniser in dialogue with phenomena rather than a passive recipient of meaning bestowing entities – such as objective values. Learners act in intentional ways. These intentions are part of one’s *whole* being including intuitions, emotions and cognitive understandings. Something of each person is present and involved in each act of valuing which in turn is dependent upon a larger framework of beliefs which provide the understandings regarding the ultimate meaning and purpose of life. Such frameworks may be reflective of humanistic or religious creeds, or they may be quite unique to individuals. Often they are obscure and unarticulated but people often allude to them in an intuitive sense as to what makes life significant for them. If the capacity of persons valuing is to be educated there must, as Dewey so often argued, be some intellectual thoroughness involved.

Through becoming educated, one’s beliefs and intentions are to be improved in some way. The value of education is recognised especially by UNESCO and Dewey in the way in which lives are enhanced. Dewey argued that “education is not a means to a living, but is identical with the operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant” (Dewey, 1985, p. 248). This is similar to Whitehead’s (1957, pp. 6-7) claim that “there is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all its manifestations.” Education, no matter how it is variously understood, implies some notion of value-adding. With regards to educational value, Dewey claimed that:

The point at issue in a theory of educational value is then the unity or integrity of experience. How shall it be full and varied without losing unity of spirit? How shall it be one and yet not narrow and monotonous in its unity? ... How shall the individual be rendered executive *in* his intelligence instead of at the cost of his intelligence? (Dewey, 1985, p. 257)

Educative value can be recognised in each individual learner who is further enabled to operate with greater intellectual thoroughness than s/he would otherwise be able to do without an education. The sort of education which Dewey recommended was experimental. He warned about the dangers of basing confidence in beliefs which have been formed ‘naturally’ or empirically. Therefore, with reference to the characteristics so often displayed by scientists such as inquisitiveness, a questioning spirit, careful observation, willingness to probe, experiment and test, Dewey argued that the common sense or social

intelligence of persons will also be improved as a result of adopting these same habits. By the exercise of experimental habits our beliefs can be tested and rigorously examined much more intellectually and therefore our way-of-being becomes more valuable.

Dewey's main focus for educative value was the *process* by which learners participated in schools and consequently their way-of-being that was enhanced as a result of these experiences, such that our relationships become "more significant and worthy" (Dewey, 1929, p.32). He was not overly concerned with specific amounts of knowledge in the form of essential information that could be remembered and repeated. Such a view is not limited to Dewey or progressivism but has also similarly been expressed in the United Kingdom by Peters (1973, p. 125) from within the analytical tradition who argued that "Values are involved in education not so much as goals or end-products, but as principles implicit in different manners of proceeding or producing". It is the process rather than the content that is to provide an important criterion for judging the educative value of an experience. Peters (1973, p. 131) claimed that pursuing the matter and the 'ends' of education, such as self-realization, "encourages an *instrumental* way of looking at the problem of justification" to the point that "it is erroneously assumed that education must be justified by reference to an end which is extrinsic to it." On this point Dewey argued that the educational process is its own end and does not have an end beyond itself. Educative value cannot be attributed to any subject or matter (such as the National Framework), because if it did "the attitude of pupils must, upon the whole, be one of docility, receptivity and obedience" (Dewey, 1997, p. 18). Instead Dewey claimed that educative value is to be determined by the two principles of continuity and interaction.

The first principle of continuity refers to the overall development of the being of the learner, as a social, intellectual and moral agent. The educative growth of the learner is to be determined by the attitudes and habits that are developed and which in turn provide the means by which further positive growth might occur. The second principle of interaction refers to the unity of the spirit as was mentioned earlier, which refers to how the learner is able to make sense of life and one's place in it. Dewey criticised traditional education for neglecting the internal disposition of the individual learners because it is from the learners' perspective that significance is given and value actualized.

Unfortunately separating education from social life in general all too often results in education becoming subsumed in a schooling system which is designed to exist for the express purpose of furthering the interests of the ruling elites. Such schooling becomes simply a means to an end which lies beyond it, located elsewhere. Dewey (1975, p. 13) quite emphatically was opposed to any assumed separation between schools and society, and argued that "only as we interpret school activities with reference to the larger circle of social activities to which they relate do we find any standard for judging their moral significance." The larger circle of social life to which Dewey envisioned was of course global in magnitude. Therefore according to Dewey the educative value of schooling can be determined by how learners are further enabled to morally and democratically participate in the global community. Such participation requires persons to engage with others in such a fashion that not only will contention, oppression, war and its associated partial or complete annihilation of mankind and the planet be a possibility, but that life for the Earth and for humanity as humanity might become enhanced. This is after all, the existential context in which education should be understood. Values are not something that must to be added to schooling. What we ought to have occurring in schools is a genuine education which is intrinsically moral in addition to being mental and skills based. Becoming educated, according to UNESCO and Dewey, involves one participating in democratic and scientific inquiry. Consequently persons do not need to *have* values imposed upon them by authorities but rather they ought to be enabled *to* value.

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